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Abstract—Scalar multiplication, the main operation in elliptic
curve cryptographic protocols, is vulnerable to side-channel
(SCA) and fault injection (FA) attacks. An efficient countermea-
sure for scalar multiplication can be provided by using alternative
number systems like the Residue Number System (RNS). In RNS,
a number is represented as a set of smaller numbers, where each
one is the result of the modular reduction with a given moduli
basis. Under certain requirements, a number can be uniquely
transformed from the integers to the RNS domain (and vice
versa) and all arithmetic operations can be performed in RNS.
This representation provides an inherent SCA and FA resistance
to many attacks and can be further enhanced by RNS arithmetic
manipulation or more traditional algorithmic countermeasures.
In this paper, extending our previous work, we explore the
potentials of RNS as an SCA and FA countermeasure and provide
an description of RNS based SCA and FA resistance means. We
propose a secure and efficient Montgomery Power Ladder based
scalar multiplication algorithm on RNS and discuss its SCA-
FA resistance. The proposed algorithm is implemented on an
ARM Cortex A7 processor and its SCA-FA resistance is evaluated
by collecting preliminary leakage trace results that validate our
initial assumptions.
I. INTRODUCTION
RNS is an arithmetic representation of integer numbers that
is advantageous when it comes to parallel arithmetic calcula-
tions. The system can also be used to represent elements of
cyclic groups or finite fields. In RNS, a number is represented
by a given moduli base (RNS base) consisting of several base
elements. The fact that each modulo of a number can be
processed in parallel (for any type of operation) as well as the
fact that a single bit fault in a moduli can lead to ”difficult to
trace” changes in an overall number, hints that there is fertile
ground for introducing RNS related Side Channel Attack
(SCA) and Fault injection Attack (FA) countermeasures in
cryptosystems [2] [4] [14] [18] [9] [10].
Scalar multiplication, the key operation behind Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC), relies heavily on finite field to
perform all arithmetic operations. Thus, the introduction of
RNS as the number system for GF (p) elements and their op-
erations can be a step towards increasing SCA/FA resistance.
However, this does not constitute enough protection against
SCAs/FAs nor does it guarantee efficient implementations.
Several researchers have made observations about the po-
tentials of RNS as a side-channel attack countermeasure as
well as a fault injection attack countermeasure. Bajard et
al. in [2] proposes, originally for modular exponentiation, a
random permutation of the moduli bases. The periodic change
using base permutation during the modular exponentiation
(and consecutively scalar multiplication) computation flow can
introduce enough randomness to thwart SCAs. This approach
leads to a leak resistant arithmetic (LRA) technique that can be
applied to modular exponentiation designs (used for RSA) in
two ways, either by choosing a new base permutation once at
the beginning of each modular exponentiation or by changing
a permutation in each modular multiplication operation of the
exponentiation process [10].
In this paper, we explore the RNS potentials in elliptic curve
scalar multiplication, extending the work done in [10], taking
into account both aspects of security (SCA/FA resistance)
and efficiency. The various ways of transformation from RNS
arithmetic to binary are explored as well as the way of
performing RNS modular multiplication. The RNS version of
the Montgomery modular multiplication algorithm is described
and its importance as the basis of both efficient and secure
RNS scalar multiplication implementation is described. We
present the current approaches on designing RNS Montgomery
multiplication and argue that the algorithm can be used as a
basis for SCA/FA resistance in scalar multiplication. To justify
the above argument, a variation of a scalar multiplication
algorithm is described that offers SCA/FA resistance through
the combination of RNS characteristics and traditional scalar
multiplication algorithmic countermeasures like the Mont-
gomery Power Ladder. The RNS based resistance of our
approach adopts the random permutation of the RNS bases
in each scalar multiplication algorithmic round, thus adapting
the LRA technique for scalar multiplication and modifying
it in order to achieve efficiency yet retain the disassociation
of secret information from physical leakage. Furthermore, in
our approach we take advantage of the base extension oper-
ation that is performed during an RNS Montgomery modular
multiplication in order to enhance fault detection. To verify
the correctness of our approach and to test its security and
efficiency, we implemented the described scalar multiplication
algorithm in the ARM Cortex A7 processor of a Raspberry Pi
2 using GMP C library as a basis for all arithmetic operations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II
the RNS arithmetic for ECC is presented. Section III presents
the employed algorithm and argues over its SCA/FA resis-
tance. Details of our implementation are included in section
IV with some preliminary results of our SCA/FA analysis.
Finally, section V concludes the paper.
II. RNS FOR EC POINT OPERATIONS
A number x can be represented in RNS as a set of n
moduli xi (x RNS→ X : (x1, x2, ...xn)) of a given RNS
basis B : (m1,m2, ...mn) as long as 0 ≤ x < M where
M =
∏n
i=1mi is the RNS dynamic range and all mi are pair-
wise relatively prime. Each xi can be derived from x by calcu-
lating xi = 〈x〉mi = x mod mi. Assuming that we have two
numbers a and d represented in RNS as A : (a1, a2, ...an) and
D : (d1, d2, ...dn) we can obtain addition, subtraction and mul-
tiplication in RNS as A⊘D = (〈a1 ⊘ d1〉m1 , ... 〈an ⊘ dn〉mn)
where ⊘ : (+,−,×). Exact division by D coprime with M
is equivalent to multiplying by the inverse 〈D−1〉M . Since
RNS is a non-positional representation, comparisons, divisions
and modular reductions are complex operations, which are
performed either by converting the number from RNS to
binary representation or by using base extension algorithms.
Binary reconstruction from RNS representation can be
done using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) x =〈∑n
i=1
〈
xi ·M
−1
i
〉
mi
·Mi
〉
M
where Mi = Mmi and M
−1
i
is the multiplicative inverse of Mi. The required M modulo
reduction, due to the high bit length of M , is not efficiently
realized and is usually performed by introducing a correction
factor w, where x =
∑n
i=1
〈
xi ·M
−1
i
〉
mi
·Mi − w ·M .
To avoid the above process, x’s Mixed Radix System (MRS)
representation X˜ : (u1, u2, ...un) can be used for RNS to
binary conversion. The MRS number X˜ can be obtained
from X : (x1, x2, x3, ...xn) by executing the Mixed Radix
Conversion (MRC) algorithm of (1).
u1 = x1 u2 =
〈
(x2 − u1) ·m
−1
1,2
〉
m2
u3 =
〈
((x3 − u1) ·m
−1
1,3 − u2) ·m
−1
2,3
〉
m3
· · ·
un = 〈((xn − u1) ·m
−1
1,n − u2) ·m
−1
2,n − . . .
− un−1) ·m
−1
n−1,n〉mn
(1)
where m−1i,j is the multiplicative inverse of mi modulo mj i.e.
mi ·m
−1
i,j ≡ 1 mod mj . From the MRS number representation,
an integer x can be recovered by performing x = u1+g2u2+
g3u3 + . . .+ gnun where gi =
∏i
j=1mj .
For ECC approved ECs defined over GF (p) (EC on
GF (2k) are not discussed in this paper), all GF (p) op-
erations (addition, subtraction, multiplication) are modular
operations. Performing RNS GF (p) addition or subtraction
can be easily realized by expressing p in RNS format i.e.
P : (p1, p2, p3, ...pn) and calculating:
(A⊘D)mod P = (
〈
〈a1 ⊘ d1〉m1
〉
p1
,
〈
〈a2 ⊘ d2〉m2
〉
p2
, ..
. . .
〈
〈an ⊘ dn〉mn
〉
pn
) where ⊘ : (+,−)
(2)
However, RNS modular multiplication over GF (p) is a
computationally difficult operation. It is usually realized
through the RNS Montgomery multiplication algorithm that
avoids modular inversions, but includes base extension opera-
tions [3] [10].
A. RNS Base Extension
Assuming that we introduce two RNS bases Bn =
(m1,m2, . . . ,mn) and B´n = (mn+1,mn+2, . . . ,m2n) such
that gcd(mi,mj) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, n} and j ∈ {n+ 1, 2n},
we express a GF(p) number x in base Bn or B´n as XB and
XB´ respectively while in both RNS bases as XB∪B´ . We define
MB∪B´ as MB∪B´
∏2n
i=1mi, also, MB =
∏n
i=1mi and M
−1
B
as the multiplicative inverse of MB in base Bn as well as
MB´ =
∏2n
i=n+1mi and M
−1
B´
as the multiplicative inverse
of MB´ in base B´n. The RNS Montgomery multiplication
(RNSMM) is presented as Algorithm 1 and as an outcome cal-
culates SB = A ·B ·M−1B modp and SB´ = A ·B ·M
−1
B modp.
Base extension from one base to the other in Algorithm 1 is
needed since M−1B does not exist in base Bn and therefore
computations must be migrated to the B´n base to come up
with SB .
xj = 〈x´1 + · · ·+mn−3 ( ´xn−2 + (mn−2 ( ´xn−1 + (mn−1x´n))))〉mj
for all j ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, ...2n} ofB´n
(3)
Algorithm 1. RNS Montgomery Modular Multiplication
RNSMM(A,D, P,Bn, B´n)
Input: Bn = (m1, . . . ,mn), B´n = (mn+1, . . . ,m2n),
P
B∪B´
= PB ∪ PB´ : (p1, p2, ...pn, pn+1, ...p2n),
MB =
∏n
i=1mi, MB´ =
∏2n
i=nmi,
A
B∪B´
= AB ∪AB´ : {a1, . . . , an, an+1, . . . a2n} ,
D
B∪B´
= DB ∪DB´ : {d1, . . . , dn, dn+1, . . . , d2n},M
−1
B´
,−P−1
B
Output: SB = AB ·DB ·M−1B modPB and
S
B´
= A
B´
·D
B´
·M−1
B
modP
B´
1. G
B∪B´
= A
B∪B´
×D
B∪B´
i.e. (gi = 〈ai × di〉mi in base Bn and g´i =
〈
a´i × d´i
〉
m´i
in base B´n)
2. QB = GB × (−P−1B ) i.e.
(〈
gi ×
〈
−p−1
〉
mi
〉
mi
)
in Bn
3. QB → QB´ Base extension Bn → B´n
4. R
B´
= G
B´
+Q
B´
× P
B´
5. S
B´
= R
B´
×M−1
B´
6. S
B´
→ SB Base extension B´n → Bn
Return SB and SB´
Two main approaches to base extension are used in practice
for RNS arithmetic: the MRS system and the Cox-Rower
architecture introduced in [16]. The Cox-Rower architecture
consists of parallel arithmetic units, the Rowers, which per-
form the independant computations for each base concurrently,
and the Cox unit dedicated to the computation of an approx-
imation of the factor w. Therefore, it can be efficiently im-
plemented in hardware. An interesting work in protecting the
Cox-Rower architecture against multi-fault attacks is presented
in [1].
The MRS system is often used for RNSMM base extension,
despite the fact that it is sequential and therefore slower
compared to Cox-Rower. As a first step of MRS, the base
Bn RNS number is converted into a base Bn MRS number
following (1). In the second step, the base Bn MRS number
is converted into a base B´n RNS number according to (3).
A similar two step procedure is followed for base extension
from B´n to Bn respectively.
It must be noted that each RNS number A used in Mont-
gomery multiplication must be represented in the Montgomery
format, meaning in the form AB · MB modPB or AB´ ·
MB´ modPB´ . To transform a number in the Montgomery
normalized form, an RNSMM must be performed between
A and MB∪B´ modP using the bases Bn and B´n in re-
verse order (i.e. RNSMM(A,MB∪B´ modP, P, B´n, Bn)). To
leave the Montgomery domain we must perform an RNSMM
of the Montgomery formatted RNS number A with 1 (i.e.
RNSMM(A, 1, P,Bn, B´n)).
Efficient base extension operation heavily relies on the
choice of Bn and B´n. To increase computation efficiency,
the bases’ moduli must be chosen so that their multiplicative
inverses are small numbers. Most studies on optimal base
moduli [7] [5] agree that moduli of the form 2k±ci, 2k−2ti±1
or 2k, 2k − 1, 2k−1 − 1 2k+1 − 1 (Mersenne numbers) for
various i values provide good performance results. Each base’s
moduli (n) number must also be optimally determined as well
as each moduli’s k value (defining all involved values bit
length). Usually, such numbers are specified according to the
GF(p) defining the EC. The RNS bases Bn and B´n dynamic
range must be close to p (4p < M ). Recent results from
Bigou and Tisserand in [6] show how to perform RNS modular
multiplication with a single base bit width instead of a double
one, which results in two times faster implementation for the
same area.
B. Using RNS for SCA and FA resistance
Several researchers have pointed out the potentials of RNS
as a side-channel and fault injection attack countermeasures.
Bajard et al. in [2] proposes, originally for modular expo-
nentiation, a random permutation of the base Bn and B´n
moduli thus creating
(
2n
n
)
random permutations of Bn and
B´n. We denote each such RNS Base γ permutation as Bn,γ
and ´Bn,γ . The periodic change of a base permutation during
the modular exponentiation (and consecutively scalar multi-
plication)computation flow , as presented in Figure 1, can
introduce enough randomness to thwart SCAs. This approach
leads to a leak resistant arithmetic (LRA) technique that can be
applied to modular exponentiation designs (used for RSA) in
two ways, either by choosing a new base permutation once at
the beginning of each modular exponentiation or by changing a
permutation in each RNSMM operation of the exponentiation
process. The base transition of an RNS number A represented
in a base permutation γ to a new permutation γ´ can be done
by performing two consecutive RNSMMs. Initially A1 =
RNSMM(A,MB∪B´ mod P, P, B´n,γ´ , Bn,γ´)
1 is performed
1Note that A has the form A ·MBn,γ mod P (Montgomery form) since
it is an output of some previous RNSMM
and it is followed by RNSMM(A1, 1, P, ´Bn,γ , Bn,γ)
b1 b2 b3 b4 b2n-3 b2n-2 b2n-1 b2n
…
Base Bn Base B’n
Pool of 2n RNS Base moduli
b1 b3 b2n-3 b2n b2n-2 b2 b4 b2n-1… …
m1 m2 … mn-1 mn mn+1 mn+2 … m2n-1 m2n
Bases to be used in RNS MM (Base extension)
Random placement (permuta!on) of n moduli as Bn and the remaining n moduli as B’n
Fig. 1. Leak Resistant Arithmetic approach on Base Randomization
Applying the LRA technique in scalar multiplication follows
a similar approach to modular exponentiation. Some attempts
to introduce LRA in scalar multiplication have been made
in [14] [13], however, they are applicable only to the CRT
type of base extension using the Cow-Rower method when
pseudo-Mersenne numbers are used for base moduli. In scalar
multiplication, a permutation transition can be done only once
(per scalar multiplication), in every round of the scalar mul-
tiplication process or before every GF (p) RNSMM operation
of every point operation of every round. Taking into account
that the transition from one permutation to another costs 2
RNSMM, the third approach is not affordable in terms of
speed. The first approach, providing a single randomization
per scalar multiplication may be vulnerable to horizontal SCA
attacks (depending on the employed implementation method-
ology) so of special interest is the second approach were
the RNS bases are permuted once per scalar multiplication
round. This approach offers a promising balance between
performance and SCA resistance strength.
RNS has a long history as fault tolerance and detection
tool and thus can be used for identifying possible FAs. Fault
detection through RNS is achieved by introducing redundancy
during RNSMM as described in [4] [17]. In the existing two
RNS bases moduli Bn and B´n used in RNSMM, a redundant
moduli mr is added. Thus the RNSMM algorithm is executed
using redundant bases Bn ∪mr and B´n ∪mr. Key point in
the detection process is base extension of the RNS values
during RNSMM from base Bn to B´n ∪ mr instead of B´n
(in step 3 of Algorithm 1) as well as base extension from B´n
to B∪mR (in step 6 of Algorithm 1). The redundant RNSMM
algorithm results SB∪mr and SB´∪mr include moduli related
to base element mr
(
i.e. 〈SB∪mr〉mr and
〈
SB´∪mr
〉
mr
)
. If
no fault is injected during an RNSMM then the 2 moduli must
be the same. This approach is capable of detecting a single
fault during a RNSMM and its main additional performance
cost (compared to the original RNSMM) is associated with
the RNS Base extension operations. A similar fault detection
technique was proposed in [14] but is applicable only to Cox
Rower RNSMM designs (that use the CRT base extension
method) while the technique described here and proposed in
[4] [10] is generic and can be applied to any base extension
methodology.
III. FA AND PA RESISTANT SCALAR MULTIPLICATION
Given the description of RNS PA and FA countermeasures,
we adopt the inclusion of LRA as an add-on countermeasure
in an PA resistant SM algorithm in order to provide horizontal
and vertical attacks resistance. In the described algorithm
(Algorithm 2), LRA is combined with the base point blinding
technique (additive randomization of the EC base point V ) in
the Montgomery Power Ladder (MPL) algorithm expanding
the work of [11] [9] and [10]. MPL is considered secure
against most vertical and horizontal attacks.
In Algorithm 2, we introduce LRA RNS base randomization
once in each SM round (steps 4c and 4d) and in that way
manage to include a different randomization element in every
round. The input point V is initially blinded by adding to it a
random element R, thus preventing sophisticated, comparative
simple PAs [8]. MPL is a highly regular SM algorithm since
it always performs two point operations per round, regardless
of the scalar bit ei. It also provides an intrinsic fault detection
mechanism based on the mathematical coherence of R0 and
R1. As observed in [15] and by Giraud in [12], the R0 and
R1 points in an MPL round always satisfy the equation R0 =
V + R1. Injecting a fault during computation in an R1 or
R0 variable will ruin this coherence and by introducing an
MPL coherence detection mechanism in the end of the MPL
algorithm, this fault will always be detected. This technique
is adopted in step 6 of Algorithm 1 where R0 + V 6= R1 if
a fault is injected. Note that the correct result is unblinded
only after the fault detection mechanism, in order to provide
protection against possible bypassing (by injecting a second
fault) of the fault detection countermeasure.
Algorithm 2. LRA PA-FA Blinded MPL algorithm
Input: EC base point V , random point R ∈ EC(GF (p)), e =
(et−1, et−2, ...e0)
1. Choose random initial base permutation γt. Transform V, R to RNS format
using γt permutation
2. R0 = R, R1 = R+ V , R2 = −R
3. CMF (R0, R1, R2, ´Bn,γt , Bn,γt )
4. For i = t− 1 to 0
(a) R2 = 2R2, always performed in initial permutation γt
(b) choose a random base permutation γi
(c) RBP (R0, Bn,γi+1 , B´n,γi+1 , Bn,γi , B´n,γi )
(d) RBP (R1, Bn,γi+1 , B´n,γi+1 , Bn,γi , B´n,γi )
(e) if ei = 1
R0 = R0 +R1 and R1 = 2R1 in permutation γi
else
R1 = R0 +R1 and R0 = 2R0 in permutation γi
end if
5. RBP (V,Bn,γt , B´n,γt , Bn,γ0 , B´n,γ0 )
6. If (i and e are not modified and R0 + V = R1)
then
(a) RBP (R0, Bn,γ0 , B´n,γ0 , Bn,γt , B´n,γt )
(b) return R0 +R2
else return error
All EC points in Algorithm 2 are represented in projective
coordinates. Conversion to Montgomery Format (CMF) oper-
ation is used for transforming all EC point coordinates into
the Montgomery format, so that RNSMM can be performed
correctly. This conversion will require 6 RNSMMs. The RBP
function performs base transformation from base permutation
γ to permutation γ´ and requires 6 RNSMMs. The RBP
function is executed in each MPL round once for point R0
and once for R1. As it can be observed from Algorithm 2,
we do not perform RBP for the R2 point doubling since this
operation already includes computations only of a random
point (it remains random during the whole scalar multipli-
cation without any interference). Note that R2 computations
retain the same base permutation γt in all MPL rounds since
R2 point doubling involves only the random EC point R (no
need to re-randomize it through RBP). However, since V is
used in the fault detection mechanism and R2 is needed for
unblinding the correct result, after the last MPL round, there
is a base transformation from the initial permutation γt to the
last round’s permutation γ0 for V and there is also a base
transformation from the last round’s permutation γ0 to the
initial permutation γt that is done after passing successful fault
detection.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In order to implement the above algorithms, a consistent
realization process was followed, based on two steps. Taking
into account that a considerable number of parameters are
constant for all scalar multiplication operations on a specific
EC (they are related to the Bases’ moduli mi, the moduli
number n and the p value of the GF(p) field defining the
EC), these values can be precomputed and stored in memory
units so as to be used repeatedly for all scalar multiplications.
Therefore, as a first step of realizing the proposed approach,
an appropriate design methodology needs to be conceived in
order to precompute and store the above mentioned values in
memory space with efficiency. This step needs to be executed
only once for all EC computations, so it can be considered as
an initialization step. The second step in the previous sections’
algorithm realization is the actual scalar multiplication design
that needs to use the precomputation structure realized in the
first step. To provide precomputations for all possible bases
moduli combinations (realizing the base permutation γ), a
numeric index (denoted as permutation index) is assigned
to each such combination and a structure is associated to
this index. This permutation structure includes the following
information:
• The permutation index γ
• The n moduli that constitute base Bn,γ
• The n moduli that constitute base ´Bn,γ
• The current Base Bn,γ dynamic range MB
There exist
(
2n
n
)
different permutation structures that are
stored in array form.
As an outcome of the first step, an entry is created as a
memory structure for each moduli of the 2 RNS Bases (needed
in the RNSMM algorithm). Such information (for a single
entry i) are the following:
• the moduli value mi
TABLE I
EDWARDS CURVE (p = 2192 − 264 − 1) CASE STUDY EMPLOYED 8 BASE
MODULI
m1 250−220−1 m5 250
m2 250−222−1 m6 250−1
m3 250−218−1 m7 251−1
m4 250−210−1 m8 249−1
• the p modmi value
• the
〈
−p−1
〉
mi
value
• A matrix of 2n elements calculating
〈
m−1j
〉
mi
for all
j ∈ {0, 1, 2n− 1}
• A matrix of
(
2n
n
)
elements calculating
〈
M−1Bn,γ
〉
mi
for
all γ ∈ {0, 1, 2n!
n!n!
− 1}
As a proof-of-concept implementation of the above de-
scribed two step design process, appropriate software code
was written for ARM cortex A class processors (having a
Raspberry Pi 2 as a reference design) using the GMP library
for all GF (p) operations. As a case study, n = 4 was used
for an Edwards based Elliptic Curve (with c = 1 and d = 2)
defined over GF(p) where p = 2192 − 264 − 1 (NIST prime
field). The employed case study moduli are presented in Table
I.
Since n = 4 there exist 70 different base permutations
which as an individual SCA countermeasure, introduce small
randomization. However, since this randomization is combined
with the base point blinding technique, the overall randomiza-
tion of the implementation leakage trace is adequate to provide
side-channel attack resistance. This can be observed from the
collected traces using Electromagnetic Emission probes from
the Raspberry Pi’s processor during the implemented scalar
multiplication execution. More precisely, our experimental
setup is the following:
• Raspberry Pi 2 Model 8 with a 900MHz quad-core Cortex
A7 processor.
• EMV Langer probe RF-U 5-2.
• Lecroy Waverunner 610Zi samping at 25MS/sec.
The traces are presented in Figure 2. As a preliminary
analysis, we obtained traces with different random points and
we observed the same patterns. High regularity in the leakage
traces prohibits simple side-channel attacks. A more detailed
analysis of the leakage traces containing several statistical tests
and profiling of the device will be performed, in order to
evaluate completely our implementation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a highly regular implementation of
RNS scalar multiplication algorithm. Our combined counter-
measure consisting of randomization of the EC base point and
random permutation of the base moduli should provide resis-
tance against the most common PA and FA attacks. Indeed,
a preliminary analysis of our traces shows high regularity in
the leakage traces. As future work, we plan to evaluate our
algorithm in more sophisticated attack scenarios, in order to
prove in practice our theoretical security analysis.
Fig. 2. proposed Scalar Multiplication EM leakage trace on Raspberry Pi 2
ARM processor
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